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1.1 Introduction
Our starting point is a particular ‘canvas’ aimed to ‘draw’ theories of physics,
which has symmetric monoidal categories as its mathematical backbone. In this
paper we consider the conceptual foundations for this canvas, and how these can
then be converted into mathematical structure.
With very little structural effort (i.e. in very abstract terms) and in a very
short time span the categorical quantum mechanics (CQM) research program,
initiated by Abramsky and the author in [6], has reproduced a surprisingly large
fragment of quantum theory [45, 171, 180, 61, 57, 62, 49, 3, 63]. It also provides
new insights both in quantum foundations and in quantum information, for
example in [59, 60, 50, 51, 80, 65, 52, 81], and has even resulted in automated
reasoning software called quantomatic [76, 77, 75] which exploits the deductive
power of CQM, which is indeed a categorical quantum logic [78].
In this paper we complement the available material by not requiring prior
knowledge of category theory, and by pointing at connections to previous and
current developments in the foundations of physics.
This research program is also in close synergy with developments elsewhere,
for example in representation theory [73], quantum algebra [177], knot theory
[188], topological quantum field theory [133] and several other areas.
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Philosophically speaking, this framework achieves the following:
• It shifts the conceptual focus from ‘material carriers’ such as particles,
fields, or other ‘material stuff’, to ‘logical flows of information’, by mainly
encoding how things stand in relation to each other.
• Consequently, it privileges processes over states. The chief structural in-
gredient of the framework is the interaction structure on processes.
• In contrast to other ongoing operational approaches ([56, and references
therein], [110], [67] etc.), we do not take probabilities, nor properties, nor
experiments as a priori, nor as generators of structure, but everything is
encoded within the interaction of processes.
• In contrast to other ongoing structural approaches ([56, and references
therein],[19], [9, 10, 118, 72, 114] etc.), we do not start from a notion of
system, systems now being ‘plugs’ within a web of interacting processes.
Hence systems are organized within a structure for which compoundness
is a player and not the structure of the system itself: a system is implicitly
defined in terms of its relation(ship)/interaction with other systems.
So for us, composition of relation(ship)s is the carrier of all structure, that
is, how several relations make up one whole. For example, if x1, x2, x3, a are in
relation(ship) R1 and y1, y2, y3, a are in relation(ship) R2 then this induces a
relation(ship) between x1, x2, x3, y1, y2, y3.
R1 R2
a
a
⇒
R1
R2
a
x1 x2
x3
y1
y2 y3
x1 x2
x3 y1
y2 y3
These relation(ship)s are much more general than the usual mathematical no-
tion of a relation. A mathematical relation only tells us whether or not a thing
relates to another thing, while for us also ‘the manner in which’ a thing relates
to another thing matters.
Processes are special kinds of relations, which make up the actual ‘happen-
ings’. Classicality is an attribute of certain processes, and measurements are
special kinds of processes, defined in terms of their capabilities to correlate
other processes to these classical attributes.
So rather than quantization, what we do is classicization within a universe
of processes. For a certain theory, classicality and measurements may or may
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not exist, since they are not a priori. For example, in analogy to ‘non-quantized
field theories’, one could consider non-classicized theories within our setting.
Our attempt to spell out conceptual foundations is particularly timely given
that other work in quantum foundations and ours are converging, most notably
Hardy’s recent work [108, 109, 110] and Chiribella, D’Ariano and Perinotti’s
even more recent work [68, 41]. Also proponents of the ‘convex set approach’
[19, 20, and references therein] as well as those of the more traditional ‘Birkhoff-
von Neumann style quantum logic’ [28, 145, 121, 159] have meanwhile adopted
an essential component of our framework [22, 18, 104, 113, 112, 116].
The mathematical flexibility of our framework allows one to craft hypothet-
ical non-physical universes, a practice which turns out to provide important
insights in the theories of physics that we know, and which recently gained
popularity, e.g. [42, 174, 23, 19]. Such approaches provide an arena to explore
how many physical phenomena arise within a theory from very few assumptions.
Our approach has been particularly successful in this context, not only by pro-
ducing many phenomena from little assumptions, but also by casting theories
that initially were defined within distinct mathematical frameworks within a
single one. For example, it unifies quantum theory as well as Spekkens’ toy
theory [174] within a single framework [50], which enabled to identify the key
differences [51], and also substantially simplified the presentation of the latter.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 briefly sketches some earlier
developments, be it because they provided ideas, or because they exposed cer-
tain sources of failure. Section 1.3 introduces the primitives of our framework:
systems, relations (and processes) and their composition. We show how these
can be used to encode identical systems, symmetries and dynamics, variable
causal structure, and an environment. Section 1.4 shows that in mathematical
terms these concepts give rise to symmetric monoidal categories. Next, in 1.5,
we define classicality and measurement processes.
As the author is not a professional philosopher but a hell of a barfly, the
philosophical remarks throughout this chapter, of which there are plenty, should
be taken with a grain of salt.
We will purposely be somewhat vague on many fronts, in order to leave
several options available for the future; the reader is invited to fill in the blanks.
1.2 Some (idiosyncratic) lessons from the past
We will in particular focus on the role of operationalism in quantum theory
reconstructions, the formal definition of a physical property as proposed by the
Geneva School (e.g. [123, 152]), the role of processes therein and, forefront role
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of processes in quantum information, the manner in which algebraic quantum
field theory [101, 100] retains the notion of a system, the modern logical view
on the different guises of the connective ‘and’ for systems, ideas of relationalism
in physics [17, 168], the options of discreteness and pointlessness in quantum
gravity, and the status of foundations of mathematics in all of this.
While we will make some reference to mathematical concepts in category
theory, order theory, C*-algebra, quantum logic, linear logic and quantum in-
formation, neither of these are prerequisites for the remainder of this paper.
To measure or not to measure
While nature hasn’t been created by us, the theories which describe it have
been, and hence, unavoidably these will have to rely on concepts that make
reference to our senses, or some easy to grasp generalizations thereof. For
example, as humans we experience a three-dimensional space around us, hence
the important role of geometry in physics. Similarly, the symmetries which we
observe around us have led to the importance of group theory in physics.
A fairly radical stance in this light is that of the typical operationalist.
His/her take on quantum theory (and physics in general) is that measurement
apparatuses constitute our window on nature. Different ‘schools’ of operational-
ists each isolate an aspect of the measurement processes which they think causes
the apparent non-classicality of quantum theory, be it the structure of the space
of probabilities, or the structure of the verifiable propositions, etc.
This practice traces back to the early days of Hilbert space quantum me-
chanics. In Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik [183] von Neu-
mann stressed that it are the projectors which make up self-adjoint operators
that should be the fundamental ingredient of whatever formalism that describes
the quantum world. Indeed, while he himself crafted Hilbert space quantum
mechanics, he was also the first to denounce it in a letter to Birkhoff [27, 166]:
“I would like to make a confession which may seem immoral: I do
not believe absolutely in Hilbert space any more.”
This focus on projectors, led to a sharp contrast with happenings in logic [28]:
“... whereas for logicians the orthocomplementation properties of
negation were the ones least able to withstand a critical analysis,
the study of mechanics points to the distributive identities as the
weakest link in the algebra of logic.” ,
and ultimately resulted in Birkhoff-von Neumann quantum logic [28].
Via Mackey [144, 145] several structural paradigms emerged: the Geneva
School [123, 159] inherited its lattice theoretic paradigm directly from Birkhoff
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and von Neumann, the Ludwig School [141, 142] associated the convex structure
of state spaces attributed to experimental situations, and the Foulis-Randall
School [89, 90, 185] considered the intersection structure of outcome spaces.
But this key role of the measurement process is rejected by many realists
for whom physical properties of a system exist independent of any form of
observation. E.g. a star still obeys quantum theory even when not (directly)
observed, and, a red pencil does not stop being red when we are not observing
it. More boldly put: Who measures the (entirely quantum) universe?1
The realist and operationalist views are typically seen as somewhat conflict-
ing. But attributing properties to systems which are not being observed, while
still subscribing to a clear operational meaning of basic concepts, was already
explicitly realized within the Geneva School Mark II [11, 152]. While its formal
guise was still quite similar to Birkhoff-von Neumann quantum logic, the lattice
structure is derived from an in-operational-terms precisely stated conception of
‘what it means for a system to possess a property’.
The following example is due to Aerts [11], and its pure classicality makes it
intriguing in its own right. Consider a block of wood and the properties ‘floating’
and ‘burning’. If, with certainty, we want to know whether the block of wood
possesses either of these properties, then we need to, respectively, throw it in
the water and observe whether it floats, or, set it on fire and observe whether
it burns. But obviously, if we observed either, we altered the block of wood in
such a manner that we won’t be able anymore to observe the other. Still, it
makes perfect sense for a block of wood to both be burnable and floatable.
In the Geneva School, one considers a systemA and the ‘yes/no’-experiments
{αi}i one can perform thereon. These experiments are related to each other in
terms of a preordering: for experiments α and β we have that α  β if and only
if, when we would perform α and obtain a ‘yes’-answer with certainty, then we
would also have obtained a ‘yes’-answer with certainty when performing β. A
property is then defined as an equivalence class for this preordering. The lattice
structure on the induced partial ordering follows from the existence of certain
product experiments.2 Such a property is called actual if the physical system
possesses it, and potential otherwise.
1This utterance is regularly heard as a motivation for various histories interpretations
[99, 94, 117], which, in turns, motivated the so-called topos approach to quantum theory
[118, 72, 114] – we briefly discuss this approach at the end of this section.
2The meet of a collection of properties arises from the experiment consisting of choosing
among experiments which correspond to these properties [11, 152]. Since these are arbitrary
meets, it also follows that the lattice has arbitrary joins (see e.g. [54]).
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Measurement among other processes
So in the Geneva School Mark II properties are a secondary notion emerging
from considering experimental procedures on a given system A. The Geneva
School Mark III emphasized the role of processes [66, 87, 43, 55, 64]. Faure,
Moore and Piron were able to derive unitarity of quantum evolution by cleverly
exploiting the definition of a physical property.3 Also the (in)famous orthomod-
ular law of quantum logic is about how properties propagate in measurement
processes.4 These results were a key motivation to organize physical processes
within certain categories, which lift the operationally motivated lattice structure
from systems to processes [55].
The crucial mathematical concept in the above is Galois adjunctions,5 the
order-theoretic counterpart to adjoint functors between categories [129]. These
are by many category-theoreticains considered as the most important concept
provided by category theory, in that almost all known mathematical construc-
tions can be formulated in a very succinct manner in terms of these. Galois
adjunctions were already implicitly present in the work by Pool in the late 1960s
[161], which arguably was the first attempt to replace the quantum formalism
by a formalism in which processes are the key players.6
From a more conceptual perspective, the idea that the structure of processes
might help us to get a better understanding of nature was already present in
the work of Whitehead in the 1950s [186] and the work of Bohr in the early
1960’s [34]. It became more prominent in the work of Bohm in the 1980s and
later also in Hiley’s [31, 32, 33], who is still pursuing this line of research [115].
So why did Pool’s work nor that by the Geneva School Mark III had ever
any real impact? As discussed in great detail in [152], the entire Geneva School
3Roughly, this argument goes as follows: if α2 is an experiment at time t2 and U is the
unitary operation which describes how the system evolves from time t1 to time t2, then we can
consider the experiment α1 at time t1 which consists of first evolving the system according
to U and then performing α2. More generally, U induces a mapping from experiments at
time t2 to experiments at time t1, and one can show that from the definition of a property
it follows that this map must preserve all infima. Using the theory of Galois adjoints it then
follows that the map which describes how properties propagate during U must preserve all
suprema. The final purely technical step then involves using Wigner’s theorem [184] and a
modern category-theoretic account on projective geometry [86, 178].
4Explicitly, for L the lattice of closed subspaces of a Hilbert space H and Pa the projector
on the subspace a lifted to an operation on L, we have
[Pa : L→ L :: b 7→ a ∧ (a⊥ ∨ b) :] a [(a→Sasaki −) : L→ L :: b 7→ a⊥ ∨ (a ∧ b)] ,
with (− →Sasaki −) the (in)famous Sasaki hook [64]. In the light of the above argument, Pa
now plays the role of how properties propagate in quantum measurements, while (a→Sasaki −)
is that map which assigns to each property after the measurement one before the measurement.
5A survey in the light of the Geneva School approach is in [54]
6More details on this are in [153].
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program only makes sense when considering ‘isolated systems’ on which we can
perform the experiments. This immediately makes it inappropriate to describe
a system in interaction with another one. This is a notorious flaw of most
quantum logic programs, which all drastically failed in providing a convincing
abstract counterpart to the Hilbert space tensor product. In the approach
outlined in this paper, we will consider an abstract counterpart to the Hilbert
space tensor product as primitive. It encodes how systems interact with other
systems, so rather than explicitly given, its character is implicitly encoded in
the structure on processes.
Today, the measurement-based quantum computational model (MBQC) poses
a clear challenge for a theory of processes. MBQC is one of the most fascinating
quantum computational architectures, which relies on the dynamics of the mea-
surement process for transforming the quantum state.7 By modeling quantum
process interaction in a dagger compact closed category, in [6, 44] Abramsky and
the author trivialized computations within the Gottesman-Chuang logic-gate
teleportation MBQC model [98]. The more sophisticated Raussendorf-Briegel
one-way MBQC model [165, 164] was accounted for within a more refined cat-
egorical setting, by Duncan, Perdrix and the author [49, 80, 63, 81].
Systems from processes
Less structurally adventurous than the Ludwig School, the Foulis-Randall School,
and the Geneva School, are the C*-algebra disciples, who prefer to stick some-
what closer to good old Hilbert space quantum mechanics. This path was
again initiated by von Neumann after denouncing Birkhoff-von Neumann style
quantum logic.8 A highlight of the C*-algebraic approach is algebraic quantum
field theory (AQFT) [101, 100, 103], mainly due to Haag and Kastler. In con-
trast with most other presentations of quantum field theory, not only is AQFT
mathematically solid, but it also has a clear conceptual foundation.
This approach takes as its starting point that every experiment takes place
within some region of space-time. Hence to each space time region R9 we assign
the C*-algebra A(R) of all observables associated to the experiments that po-
tentially could take place in that region.10 While, quantum field theory does not
7Recently, Rau realized a reconstruction of Hilbert space based on a set of axioms which
takes the fact that the one-way measurement-based quantum computational model can realize
arbitrary evolutions as its key axiom [163], and proposes this dynamics-from-measurement-
processes as a new paradigm for quantum foundations.
8For a discussion of the what and the why of this we refer the reader to [166].
9Which is typically restricted to open diamonds in Minkowski space-time.
10It is a natural requirement that inclusion of regions R ⊆ R′ carries over to C*-algebra
embeddings A(R) ↪→ A(R′), since any experiment that can be performed within a certain
region of space-time can also be performed within a larger region of space-time. The key
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support the quantum mechanical notion of system due to the creation and anni-
hilation of particles, AQFT re-introduces by means of regions of space-time and
associated algebras of observables a meaningful notion of system (R,A(R)).11
In [42] C*-algebras also provided an arena for Clifton, Bub and Halvor-
son’s to address Fuchs’ and Brassard’s challenge to reconstruct the quantum
mechanical formalism in terms of information-theoretic constraints [92, 39, 93].
Meanwhile it has been recognized by at least one of the authors that most of
the work in this argument is done by the C*-algebra structure rather than by
axioms [102], hence a more abstract mathematical arena is required.
The logic of interacting processes
What does it mean to have two or more systems? I.e. what is “A and B”:
1. I have a choice between A and B.
2. I have both A and B.
3. I have an unlimited availability of both A and B.
Developments in logic have started to take account of these sorts of issues.
In particular, Girard’s linear logic [95, 179, 1, 8] (which originated in the late
1980s) makes the difference between either having the availability of one out of
two alternatives, or having both alternatives available.12 The first of the two
conjunctions in linear logic, the non-linear conjunction, is denoted by &, while
the second one, the linear conjunction, is denoted by ⊗. The difference is:
A ` A&A A&B ` A while A 6` A⊗A A⊗B 6` A .
That is, in words, from the fact that A (resp. A&B) holds we can derive that
also A&A (resp. A) holds, but from the fact that A (resp. A ⊗ B) holds we
axiom of algebraic quantum field theory is that space-like separated regions correspond to
commuting C*-algebras. All these C*-algebras are then combined in a certain manner to
form a giant C*-algebra A. The connection with space-time is retained by a mapping which
sends each space-time region on the corresponding sub-C*-algebra of A, and the embeddings
of C*-algebras now become themselves inclusions.
11Compact closed categories play a key role within AQFT [73, 74, 103], but their role in
AQFT is conceptually totally different from this role in our framework. The natural manner
to recast AQFT as a monoidal category, somewhat more in the spirit of the developments of
this paper, would be to replace the C*-algebra A by a monoidal category with the sub-C*-
algebras of A as the objects, and completely positive maps as morphisms, subject to some
technical issues to do with the non-uniqueness of the tensor product of C*-algebras.
12Since its birth, linear logic did not only radically change the area of logic, but has im-
mediately played a very important role in computer science, and still does [83]. The first
occurrence of linear logic in the scientific literature was in Lambek’s mathematical model for
the grammar of natural languages [137] in the 1950s.
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cannot derive that also A ⊗ A (resp. A) holds. Hence, the linear conjunction
treats its arguments as genuine resources, that is, they cannot freely be copied
nor discarded. It is a resource sensitive connective.
From a naive truth-based view on logic, where A merely stands for the fact
that this particular proposition holds, the failure of the last two entailments
might look weird. However, a more modern view on logic is obtained in terms
of proof theory. In this perspective A stands for the fact that one possesses a
proof of A, A ⊗ B stands for the fact that one possesses a proof of A and a
proof of B, and A⊗A stands for the fact that one possesses two proofs of A.
In proof theory propositions mainly play a supporting role. What is of
particular interest in proof theory is the dynamics of proofs: how to turn a
long proof into a short one, how to eliminate lemmas etc. In other words, the
derivation process (i.e. proof) is the key player, and it is all about how proofs
compose to make up another proof. The mathematical arena where all of this
takes place is that of closed symmetric monoidal categories e.g. [170].
One indeed can take the view that ‘states’ stand to ‘systems’ in physics
as ‘proofs’ stand to ‘propositions’ in logic. ‘Physical processes’ which turn a
system into another in physics then correspond to ‘derivation processes’ of one
proposition into another in logic. In this view, systems mainly serve as things
along which physical processes can be composed, a view that we shall adopt
here.
Processes as relations
Once one considers processes and their interactions as more fundamental than
systems themselves one enters the realm of relationalism.
One well-known recent example of relationalism is Barbour and Bertotti’s
take on relativity theory in terms of Mach’s principle [17], which states that
inertia of a material system is only meaningful in relation to its interaction with
other material systems [143]. Rovelli’s relational interpretation of quantum
theory [168] considers all systems as equivalent, hence not subscribing to a
classical-quantum divide, and all information carried by systems as relative to
other systems. Here we will also adopt this relational view on physics.
One thing that relationalism provides is an alternative to the dominant
“matter in space-time”-view on physical reality, by taking space-time to be a
secondary construct. What it also does, is that it relaxes the constrains imposed
by no-go theorems on accounts of the measurement problem [96, 122, 132].13
13It is a common misconception that the Kochen-Specker theorem [132, (1967)] would be
in any way the first result of its kind. It is in fact a straightforward corollary of Gleason’s
theorem [96, (1957)], and a crisp direct no-go theorem was already provided by Jauch and
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For example, if a systems’ character is defined by its relation to other systems,
contextuality, rather than being something weird, becomes not just perfectly
normal, but a fundamental requirement for a theory not to be trivial.14
The main problem with relationalism seems to be that, while it is intuitively
appealing, there is no clear formal conception. This is where category theory
[84] provides a natural arena, in that it abstracts over the internal structure of
objects (cf. the properties of a single physical system), and instead considers the
structure of morphisms between systems (cf. how systems relate to each other).
Monoidal categories [25, 146] moreover come with an intrinsic notion of com-
pound system. In their diagrammatic incarnation, these categories translate
‘being related’ into the topological notion of ‘connectedness’. The ‘non-free’
part of the structure then provides the modes in which things can be related.
It seems to us that the dagger compact symmetric monoidal structure [7, 171]
in particular provides a formal counterpart to the relational intuition. A more
detailed and formal discussion of this issue is in Section 1.4.3.
Mathematical rigor
One of the favorite activities of operationalists is to reconstruct quantum theory
by imposing reasonable axioms on families of experimental situations. Some
recent examples of such reconstructions are [105, 67, 163].
This tradition was initiated by Mackey [144] around 1957, with Piron’s 1964
theorem as the first success [158]. The different attempts vary substantially in
terms of their mathematical guise, in that some reconstructions start from the
very foundations of mathematics, e.g. [158, 159, 176], while others will take
things like the real continuum as God-given in order to state the axioms in a
very simple language, e.g. [105]. Quoting Lucien Hardy on this [105]:
“Various authors have set up axiomatic formulations of quantum
theory, [...] The advantage of the present work is that there are a
small number of simple axioms, [...] and the mathematical meth-
ods required to obtain quantum theory from these axioms are very
straightforward (essentially just linear algebra).”
Quoting Tom Yorke, singer of the Oxford based band Radiohead [162]:
“Karma Police, arrest this man. He talks in Maths.”
Piron [122, (1963)]. A discussion of this is in Belinfante’s book [24].
14Obviously this paragraph may be for many the most controversial, challenging or inter-
esting one in this paper. They would have probably liked to see more on it. We expect to do
this in future writings once we have obtained some more formal support for our claims.
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It is an undeniable fact that mathematical rigor is one of the key cornerstones
of science. But on the other hand, very important science has been developed
long before there existed anything like a foundation of mathematics. Even
in recent history scientific progress was only possible by not subscribing to
mathematical rigor, of which the problem of renormalization in quantum field
theory is the most prominent witness, even leading to a Nobel Prize.
Ultimately this boils down to the respect one gives to mathematics. Roughly
put, is mathematics an a priori given thing which we can use to formulate our
theories of physics, or, is it something secondary that intends to organize our
experiences, be it when reasoning, exploring nature, or whatever, and that
should be adjusted to cope with our evolving spectrum of experiences? Simpler
put, do we serve mathematics or does mathematics serves us?
Our approach will be to assume a physical reality, with the things ‘out there’
truly happening. We will consider certain physical primitives, namely relations
and composition thereof. These primitives come with a notion of ‘sameness’
which will play the role of equality, i.e. it will tell us when compositions of
relations are equal.15 As a second step, we will try to match these physical
primitives with a mathematical structure, namely particular kinds of categories.
This, despite the great flexibility of category theory, will come at a certain cost.
In our view, Hilbert’s proposal to axiomatize physics 16 is a very different
ball game than axiomatizing mathematics,17 something which also proved to be
a far more delicate business than one imagined at first.
Our goal is also quite different from the reconstructionists. Rather than
reproducing quantum theory with a set of reasonable axioms, our goal is rather
to reproduce as much as possible physical phenomena with as little as possible
‘structural effort’ or ‘axiomatic compromise’, hence providing a very flexible
setting that may be better adjusted to the theories of the future.
The continuous or the discrete?
In the light of future theories of quantum gravity it has been argued that we
may have to abandon our reliance on the continuum, be it either with respect
15Let us mention that currently, even within the foundations of mathematics we don’t really
know what the sign ‘=’ stands for. In universal algebra it is a binary predicate, but once one
goes beyond classical logic this breaks down. In first order logic equality is a distinguished
binary relation. In higher-order logic it is given by Leibniz identity which identifies things
with the same properties [138]. In Martin-Lo¨f type theory [151] and Bishop-style constructive
mathematics [29] one uses yet again other notions of equality. In categorical logic [120] several
options are still being explored. Credits for this concise summary go to Phil J. Scott.
16Cf. Hilbert’s 6th problem [167].
17Cf. Hilbert’s 2nd problem on the consistency of axiomatic arithmetic [167]. Go¨del later
showed that this issue cannot be settled within arithmetic itself [97].
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to the structure of the space of states, spectra of observables, space-time, or
even probability valuation. Quoting Isham and Butterfield [119]:
“... the succes of [the edifice of physics] only shows the ‘instrumen-
talist utility’ of the continuum — and not that physical quantities
have real-number values ... there is no good a priori reason why
space should be a continuum; similarly, mutatis mutandis for time.”
“... limiting relative frequency interpretation seems problematic in
the quantum gravity regime ... for the other main interpretations of
probability — subjective, logical or propensity — there seems to us
to be no compelling a priori reason why it should be real numbers.”
Once one abandons the continuum as a mathematical default we need a paradigm
and/or mechanism to either reproduce it or replace it by.
One option are ‘spaces without points’, which both have a topological and
geometric incarnation, respectively called locales and frames [124].18 These
spaces have been used both to model spectra as well as truth-values in the so-
called topos approach to physical theories, which rose to prominence some ten
years ago with the still ongoing work of Isham, collaborators and followers.19
Both the locales/frames as well as topos theory also provide a mathematical
foundation for intuitionistic logic [182, 125]. In all of their guises they have
been particularly popular among computer scientists.
Also popular among computer scientists are discrete combinatorial spaces.
In fact, computer scientists proposed various discrete space-time structures [139,
157] well before physicists did so (e.g. Sorkin et al. [35]).
Our setting is flexible enough to accommodate both perspectives. For ex-
ample, a topos gives rise to a so-called alegory of generalized relations [91], and
similar, categories arise when organizing combinatorial species [126, 127, 88].
In fact, even at a much more basic level categories abstract over concrete
well-pointed spaces, by abstracting over the actual structure of objects. They
obviously also immediately provide a rich variety of combinatorial structures,
in that they themselves always form a graph.
18Locales and frames are a beautiful example of how the nature of a mathematical structure
can change merely by changing the nature of its relation to other structures of the same kind,
rather than by changing the structure itself: in category theoretic terms, locales and frames
are exactly the same objects, but live in a different category; one obtains the category of
locales simply by reversing the direction of the arrows in the category of frames.
19The first work in this area seems to be by Adelman and Corbett in the 1993’s [9, 10].
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1.3 Systems ← relations ← composition
We mentioned that operational approaches appeal to our everyday experiences,
or some easy to grasp generalization thereof. Also here we will make some
reference to our perceptions, but at a much more abstract level than in all of
the above mentioned examples. Not measurement devices, nor probabilities,
nor propositions, nor classical mechanics concepts such as 3D space, concrete
observables such as position, nor the real continuum will play any role.
We assume as primitive a flexible notion of system, a very general notion of
relation between these, and two modes of composition of the latter, one which
typically imposes dependencies between the processes that one composes and
one which excludes dependencies. In graphical terms these will correspond with
the primal topological distinction between ‘connected’ and ‘disconnected’, cf.:
connected ∼
g
f
disconnected ∼ 1f f2
Within our approach, which models how relations compose to make up other
relations, systems play the role of the ‘plugs’ by means of which we can create
dependencies between relations in one of the two modes of composition.
So while it is in ‘bottom-up’ order in which we introduce the basic concepts:
systems → relations → composition
in order to appeal to the reader’s intuition, the most important concept is
composition. Relations are then those things that we can compose, and systems
the things along which we can compose these relations in a dependent manner.
This top-down view may seem to go in the opposite direction of a physi-
cists’ reductionist intuition. Nonetheless it is something the physicist is well
acquainted with. For symmetry groups, it is not the elements of the group that
are essential, but the way in which they multiply (∼ compose), since the same
set of elements may in fact carry many different group structures. In a similar
manner that group structure conveys the shape of a space, the composition
structure on relations will convey the ‘shape’ of the ‘universe of processes’.
In support of the reader’s intuition we refer to ‘properties’ of a system
when discussing concepts, but this has no defining status whatsoever. For this
discussion, we will inherit the ‘actual’ versus ‘potential’ terminology from the
Geneva School, the first saying something about the state of the system, while
the second says something about the system itself.
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1.3.1 Systems
So the prime purpose of a notion of system is to support the notion of a relation,
systems being those things along which relations can be composed.
More intuitively, by a system we mean something identifiable about which
we can pose questions, and hence about which it makes sense to speak about
‘properties’. It is the latter which are usually stated relative to our world of ex-
periences. This however does not mean that a system is completely determined
by that what we consider to be its actual properties, nor that necessarily there
exists an experiment by means of which we can verify these.20 An example of a
system that is not completely determined by its actual properties is one which
is part of a larger system, that is, when considering ‘parts of a larger whole’.
We denote systems by A, B, C, ...
Example: quantum systems. Quantum systems are the entities that we
describe in Hilbert space quantum theory e.g. position, momentum or spin.
Here, systems that are not completely determined by their actual properties are
those described by density operators, which arise due to a lack of knowledge as
well as by tracing out part of a compound system. The need for a concept of
system which is not characterized in terms of its actual properties becomes even
more important in the case of quantum field theory, where we want to be able
to consider what is relevant about the field for a certain region of space-time.
Example: AQFT and beyond. In AQFT the systems are the C*-algebras
associated to a region of space-time [100, 103]. So a system is a pair (R,A(R))
whereR is a region of space-time andA(R) represents the observables attributed
to that region. This idea of a pair consisting of a space-time region and another
mathematical object which encodes observables can be generalized to other
manners of encoding observables, for example, in terms of observable structures
i.e. special commutative dagger Frobenius algebras (see below) on an object
in a dagger symmetric monoidal category (see below) as is done in categorical
quantum mechanics [61, 62, 59]. These two perspectives are not that far apart,
given that Vicary has shown in [181] that finite dimensional C*-algebras are
precisely the non-commutative generalizations of observables structures in the
dagger symmetric monoidal category FHilb (see below).
20There are many things we can speak about without being able to set up an experiment, for
example, simply because the technology is not (yet) available. One could consider speaking
in terms of hypothetical or idealized experiments, but we don’t know the technologies of the
future yet. These will be based on theories of the future, and since crafting these theories of
the future is exactly the purpose of this framework, guessing would lead to a circularity.
Deep Beauty—Coecke (rev. yyyy Mmm dd) 15
By I we denote the system which represents everything that we do not ex-
plicitly consider within our theory. One may refer to this as the environment,
i.e. what is not part of our domain of consideration. Intuitively put, it is the
system which represents everything to which we do not attribute any properties
whatsoever. Formally it will play the role of the ‘trivial system’ in that compos-
ing it with any other system A will yield that system A itself. Obviously, what
will be considered as I may in part be a cognitive decision, or a technological
constraint, or maybe a fundamental physical principle.21 Here these interpre-
tational issues won’t matter. What does matter is that there is a domain of
consideration, and that everything else falls under the umbrella of I.
Example: open systems. In open systems theory (e.g. [69, 134]) I stands for
the environment. In quantum theory it is I which is responsible for decoherence.
Sections 1.4.4 and 1.5 elaborate on this issue in great detail.
Our account on systems as ‘a bag of things’ may sound naive and it indeed
is. A more realistic account which involves the notion of subsystem is discussed
in Section 1.3.4. This will require that we first introduce some other concepts.
We denote “system A and system B” by A ⊗ B. The precise meaning of
A⊗B will become clear below from what we mean by composition of processes.
In particular, we will see that A and B in A ⊗ B will always be independent
and hence distinct i.e. we cannot conjoin a systems with itself.
The notation A1⊗A2 (wrongly) indicates that A1 and A2 are ordered. This
is an unavoidable artifact of the 1 dimensional linear notation which is employed
in most natural languages as well as in the majority of mathematical notation.
Hence A1 ⊗ A2 is to be conceived as ‘a set of two systems’ rather than as ‘an
ordered pair of two systems’.
Example: AQFT and beyond. AQFT considers an inclusion order on
diamond-shaped regions which carries over on inclusion for C*-algebras. In-
tuitively, the joint system would consist of the union of the two regions and
the corresponding union of C*-algebras, at least in the case that the regions
are space-like separated. But two regions do not make up a diamond anymore,
so this naive notion of system A and system B would already take one beyond
the AQFT framework. A paper on this subject is in preparation with Samson
Abramsky, Rick Blute, Marc Comeau, Timothy Porter and Jamie Vicary [4].
21For example, the disciples of the so-called ‘Church of the larger Hilbert space’ seem to
believe that system I could always be eliminated from any situation in quantum theory.
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1.3.2 Processes and their composition
Processes are relations that carry the ‘genuine physical substance’ of a theory.
It are those entities we think of as actually ‘happening’ or ‘taking place’ (as
opposed to the symmetry relations discussed below in Sec. 1.3.5). They arise
by ‘orienting’ a relation, that is, by assigning input/output-roles to the systems
it relates, i.e. it is a relation that ‘happens’ within a by us perceived causal
structure – cf. a partial ordering, or more generally, a directed graph.
Intuitively, a process embodies how properties of system A are transformed
into those of system B. The environment may play an important role in this.
The type of a process is the specification of the input system A and the
output system B, and is denoted as A → B. We call A the input and B the
output of the process. Processes themselves are denoted as f : A→ B.
Example: operations. Processes can be the result of performing an oper-
ation on a system A in order to produce system B, e.g. measuring, imposing
evolution, or any other kind of experimental setup. Our whole framework could
be given a more radical operational connotation, by restricting to processes aris-
ing from operations. It would then match Hardy’s recent proposal [109].
Example: quantum processes. These include state preparations, evolu-
tions, demolition and non-demolition measurement processes etc.
Example: de-instrumentalizing Geneva School Mark II. One can mod-
ify the Geneva School Mark II approach by replacing the experimental projects
with any process f that may cause a particular other process fyes to happen
thereafter. Roughly put: a property of a system would then be an equivalence
class of those processes which cause fyes to happen with certainty.
The trivial process from system A to itself is denoted by 1A : A → A. It
‘happens’ in the sense that it asserts the existence of system A, and it trivially
obeys causal order. These trivial processes are useful in that they provide a
bridge between systems and processes, by associating to each system a process.
For all other non-trivial processes the input and the output are taken to be
non-equal i.e. if the type of a process is A→ A then it is (equal to) 1A.
By a state we mean a process of type I → A, and by an effect we mean a
process of type A→ I. What is important for a state is indeed what it is, and
not its origin, which can consequently be comprehended within I.
By a weight we mean a process of type I→ I.
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Sequential composition. The sequential or causal or dependent composition
of processes f : A→ B and g : B → C is the process which relates input system
A to output system C. We denote it by:
g ◦ f : A→ C .
We will also refer to g ◦ f as “g after f” or as “first f and then g”.
Example: operations. For processes resulting from operations, g ◦ f is the
result of first performing operation f and then performing operation g. The
operations corresponding to states are preparation procedures.
Example: weights as probabilities. When we compose a state ψ : I→ A
and an effect pi : A→ I then the resulting weight pi◦ψ : I→ I can be interpreted
as the probability of the sequence “pi after ψ” to happen. That a projective
measurement effect in quantum theory may be impossible for certain states and
certain for others boils down to 〈φ| ◦ |ψ〉 = 0 while 〈φ| ◦ |φ〉 6= 0 for |ψ〉 ⊥ |φ〉.
More generally, these weights can articulate likeliness of processes.
Separate composition. The separate or acausal or independent composition
of processes f1 : A1 → B1 and f2 : A2 → B2 is the process which relates input
system A1 ⊗A2 to output system B1 ⊗B2. We denote it by:
f1 ⊗ f2 : A1 ⊗A2 → B1 ⊗B2 .
The key distinction between sequential and separate composition in terms
of ‘dependencies’ between processes is imposed by the following constraint.
Independence constraint on separate composition. A process is inde-
pendent from any process to which it is not ‘connected via sequential compo-
sition’, and the same holds for the systems that make up the types of these
processes, with the exception of the environment I. In particular, within the
compound process f ⊗ g the processes f and g are independent.
We will precisely define what we mean by ‘connected via sequential compo-
sition’ in Section 1.3.3, by relying on the topological notion of ‘connectedness’.
The spirit of this constraint is that causal connections can only be established
via dependent composition, not by means of separate composition.
Example: operations. When considering processes resulting from opera-
tions, f1 and f2 in f1 ⊗ f2 are realized by two independent operations. This
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means that the setup in which one realizes one operation should be sufficiently
isolated from the one that realizes the other operation.
The independence of f1 and f2 in f1 ⊗ f2 imposes independence of A1 and
A2 in A1⊗A2 and of B1 and B2 in B1⊗B2, which indeed forces A1 and A2 in
A1 ⊗A2 and B1 and B2 in B1 ⊗B2 to always be distinct.
Example: AQFT. For intersecting regions R and R′ the systems (R,A(R))
and (R′, A(R′)) are obviously not independent. Neither are they for regions R
and R′ that are causally related.
While in f1⊗f2 the two processes have to be independent, this does not ex-
clude that via causal composition with other processes dependencies can emerge:
Example: quantum entanglement. Although two quantum processes f1 :
A1 → B1 and f2 : A2 → B2 are independent in f1⊗ f2, it may of course be the
case that due to common causes in the past measurements on their respective
output systems B1 and B2 may expose correlations. In that case we are in fact
considering (f1 ⊗ f2) ◦ |Ψ〉 where |Ψ〉 : I → B1 ⊗ B2. In this case, as we shall
see below, B1 and B2 are connected via sequential composition.
Note that the exception of I in the independence constraint allows for:
A⊗ I = A ,
which affirms that the environment may always play a certain role in a process.
On a more philosophical note, within our setting the independence con-
straint replaces the usual conception of sufficient isolation within the scientific
method [160, 152]: we do not assume that systems or processes are sufficiently
isolated, but our formal vehicle which represents when we compose them im-
plicitly requires that they are independent, the environment excluded.
Now consider the four processes:
f1 : A1 → B1 f2 : A2 → B2 g1 : B1 → C1 g2 : B2 → C2 (1.1)
Note that causal composition of the processes f1 ⊗ f2 and g1 ⊗ g2 resulting
from separate composition, which implies matching intermediate types, is well-
defined since B1 and B2 will always be taken to be distinct in B1 ⊗B2. But
there is another manner in which we can compose these processes to make up a
whole of type A1⊗A2 → C1⊗C2, namely by separate composition of g1◦f1 and
g2 ◦ f2. While symbolically these two compounds are represented differently,
physically they represent the same overall relation, and hence:
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Interaction rule for compositions. For processes (1.1) we have:
(g1 ◦ f1)⊗ (g2 ◦ f2) = (g1 ⊗ g2) ◦ (f1 ⊗ f2) .
Similarly, for systems A1 and A2 we also have:
1A1 ⊗ 1A2 = 1A1⊗A2 .
Non-isolated systems and probabilistic weights of states
The natural way to assert inclusion of non-isolated (or open) systems within a
theory of processes is in terms of a particular kind of process:
>A : A→ I
that ‘feeds’ a system into the environment I, and hence explicitly realizes such a
non-isolated system. Feeding a system A into the environment can be achieved
by taking a process f : A→ B and by then ‘deciding’ to consider B as part of
the environment I. So as was the case for I, these feeding-into-the-environment
processes may involve a cognitive component.
What characterizes such a feed-into-environment process? Firstly, it is easily
seen that we can always set:
>A⊗B := >A ⊗>B and >I := 1I .
Secondly, it should be allowed to happen with certainty, independently on the
state of the system, as opposed to, for example, the projective measurement
effects in quantum theory discussed above. Denoting weights by W, given a
measure that assigns weights to each process, and in particular to states S:
| − | : S→W ,
a feed-into-environment process >A should be such that applying it leaves the
weight of the state it is applied to invariant, i.e. concretely:
>A ◦ ψ = |>A ◦ ψ| = |ψ| (1.2)
for all states ψ : I → A, where the first equality merely says the weight of
a weight is itself. But (1.2) can now also be dually interpreted: feed-into-
environment processes are characterized in that they provide the measure for
assigning weights to states, by post-composing states with them.
Example: traces and probabilities in quantum theory. In quantum
theory, the completely positive maps that trace out spaces play the role of the
feed-into-environment processes:
trH :: ρH 7→
∑
i
〈i|ρH|i〉 .
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These indeed stand for ignoring part of a system as well as for measuring the
overall probability of a non-normalized density matrix. Note in particular that
these are the only completely positive maps which satisfy (1.2) for every possible
state. In the language of [41], trH is the unique deterministic effect on H.
1.3.3 Graphical representation of processes
The data specified above can be given a diagrammatic representation:
f ≡ f g ◦ f ≡
g
f
f1 ⊗ f2 ≡ 1f f2
That is:
• a process is represented by a box with inputs and outputs ;
• − ◦ − is represented by connecting outputs to inputs ;
• − ⊗− is represented by not connecting boxes.
The object I will be represented by ‘no wire’, and:
ψ ≡ ψ : I→ A pi ≡ pi : A→ I ω ≡ ω : I→ I
What is particularly nice in this graphical representation is that the inter-
action rule automatically holds, since translating both its left-hand-side and its
right-hand-side into the graphical calculus both result in the same:
(g1◦f1)⊗(g2◦f2) = (g1⊗g2)◦(f1⊗f2) ⇔
=
1f f2
1g g2
1f f2
1g g2
This shows that also the interaction rule is in fact nothing more than an artifact
of one-dimensional symbolic notation!
Here is the definition we promised earlier:
Definition. Two processes are connected via sequential composition if in the
graphical representation they are topologically connected.
There also is a direct translation of this graphical representation of processes
to directed graphs and vice versa. The rules to do this are:
• processes (i.e. boxes, triangles, diamonds etc.) become the nodes ;
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• systems (i.e. wires between boxes) become directed edges, with the direc-
tion pointing from what used to be an output to an input.
Such a directed graph makes the underlying causal structure on processes ex-
plicit. Here’s an example of this:
f h
g
z
x
_~
z
x
hf
g
In this example all processes are connected via sequential composition as the
picture is as a whole connected.
Special processes can be give special notations, for example, a feed-into-
environment process >C : C → I could be denoted as:
>C ≡ so (1B ⊗>C) ◦ f ≡ f
for f : A→ B ⊗ C.
In two-dimensional graphical language, as it is the case for symbolic no-
tation, systems appear in a certain order (cf. from-left-to-right) which has no
direct ontological counterpart. However, in the graphical notation this order
can be exploited to identify distinct systems in terms of their position within
the order, hence in part omitting the necessity to label the wires. More on this
will follow below. One can of course also think of these pictures as living in 3
dimensions rather than in 2 dimensions, or some even more abstract variation
thereof. One calls graphs which exploit a third dimension non-planar [172].
Planar graphs are subject to Kuratowski’s characterization theorem [135].
1.3.4 Physical scenarios, snapshots and subsystems
A physical scenario is a collection of processes together with the composition
structure in which they happen. By the resolution of a scenario we mean the
resulting overall process. A scenario comprises more information than its reso-
lution, in that it also comprehends the manner in which the overall process is
decomposed in subprocesses. Obviously, the selection of a particular scenario
which has a given process as its resolution has no actual physical content, but
is merely a subjective choice of what to consider as the parts of a whole.
Given such a physical scenario, one can consider a subset of the systems
appearing within it, neither of which are causally related, e.g. those connected
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by the hand-drawn line in the following picture:
f h
g
z
x
_~
z
x
hf
g
k
l
l
l
We call such a collection of systems appearing in a scenario a snapshot.
Note that it is not excluded that snapshots resulting from distinct scenarios
are the same, for example, the hand-drawn line:
f h
g
z
x
k
l
X X X
X
X X
X
represents a snapshot both for the restriction of the boxes to those with a white
cross as well as for the restriction to those with a black cross.
Example: relativistic causal histories. These snapshots are Hardy’s ‘sys-
tems’ within his instrumental framework [109, 110]. In turns, these general-
ize Blute, Panangaden and Ivanov’s ‘locative slices’ within their framework
which endows standard quantum mechanical operations with a causal ordering
[26, 154]. A dual point of view was earlier put forward by Markopoulou [149].
These snapshots are indeed systems as much as any other system. But as
mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter, they are not anymore the
primal physical concept, but things along we ‘decide’ to decompose processes.
It is the resolution of the snapshot which is physically the only primal concept.
Note that there exists a partial order on systems in terms of inclusion of
snapshots. For example,
f
h
g
z
x
k
l
A
B
C
D
F
G
E
I
A B C
D FE
G
⇒
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This in particular implies that ‘being non-equal’ for systems, as for example in
A ⊗ B, does not capture independence. In mathematical terms, it should be
replaced by disjointness within the Boolean algebra structure arising from these
snapshots. A formal account on this is being developed with Ray Lal in [53].
1.3.5 Symmetry relations
Unlike processes, symmetry relations do not represent actual ‘happenings’, nor
do they have to respect any by us perceived causal structure. Rather, they
will enable one to express structural properties (i.e. symmetries) of the pro-
cesses which make up the physical universe, in a manner similar to how the
Galileo/Lorentz group conveys the shape of space-time. But rather than being
a structure on processes, in our approach they will interact with processes in
the same manner as processes interact with each other, in terms of ◦ and ⊗,
so that we can treat them as ‘virtual processes’ within an ‘extended universe’
which does not only consist of processes but also of symmetry relations, as well
as the relations arising when composing these. The interaction of processes and
symmetry relations would for example embody how usually dynamics is derived
in terms of representations of the Galileo/Lorentz group. Here, such a virtual
process could for example be a Lorentz boost along a space-like curve.
Intuitively, symmetry relations relate properties of one system to those of
another system, and since the content carried by a process is how properties of
system A are transformed in those of system B, it indeed makes perfect sense
to treat processes and symmetry relations on the same footing. Consequently,
we can extend dependent composition to symmetry relations, but it obviously
loses its causal connotation. Also separate composition can evidently be ex-
tended to symmetry relations, separation now merely referring to some formal
independence. Consequently we can also still speak of scenarios and snapshots.
For some the distinction between process and symmetry relation might seem
somewhat artificial. But this would in fact even more advocate our framework.
Example: active and passive rotations in classical mechanics. In clas-
sical mechanics rotations of a rigid body are ‘processes’ modeled in SO(3), while
the SO(3) fragment of the Gallilei group consists of ‘symmetry relations’ which
assert the rotational symmetry of three-dimensional Euclidean space.
Example: inverses to processes. We define an inverse to a process f :
A→ B as the symmetry relation f−1 : B → A which satisfies:
f−1 ◦ f = 1A and f ◦ f−1 = 1B . (1.3)
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It immediately follows that such an inverse, if it exists, is unique.
Example: identical systems. How can we describe distinct but ‘identical’
systems? A pair of systems A1 and A2 is identical if it comes with a pair of
mutually inverse relations 1A1,A2 : A1 → A2 and 1A2,A1 : A2 → A1. Explicitly:
1A2,A1 ◦ 1A1,A2 = 1A1 and 1A1,A2 ◦ 1A2,A1 = 1A2 .
Let f : C → A1 and g : A1 → C be any processes. We set:
FA1,A2f := 1A1,A2 ◦ f and GA1,A2g := g ◦ 1A2,A1 (1.4)
These can also be represented in a commutative diagram [147, 148]:
D
A1
1A1,A2
11
g
>>}}}}}}}}
A2
1A2,A1
qq
GA1,A2g
``AAAAAAAA
C
f
``AAAAAAAA FA1,A2f
>>}}}}}}}}
i.e. a diagram in which any two paths which take you from one system to another
are equal. It also follows that:
FA2,A1FA1,A2f = f and GA2,A1GA1,A2g = g .
Intuitively, the relations 1A1,A2 and 1A2,A1 identify the potential properties
of systems A1 and A2, and do this in a mutually inverse manner due to
1A1,A2 ◦ 1A2,A1 = 1A2 and 1A2,A1 ◦ 1A1,A2 = 1A1 . The assignments FA1,A2(−)
(respectively GA1,A2(−)) and FA2,A1(−) (respectively GA2,A1(−)) identify pro-
cesses involving A1 and A2 as output (resp. input) in a similar manner.
Example: identical processes. We leave it to the reader to combine the
notion of inverse and that of identical systems into identical processes.
Example: bosonic states. The symmetric states
Ψ : I→ A1 ⊗ . . .⊗An
which describe non-isolated bosons can now be defined. For any permutation
σ : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n}
we have:
(1A1,Aσ(1) ⊗ . . .⊗ 1An,Aσ(n)) ◦Ψ = Ψ , (1.5)
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i.e. when permuting the roles of the (identical) systems that make up the joint
system, then that state should remain invariant. Graphically, we represent the
symmetry relation 1A1,Aσ(1) ⊗ . . .⊗ 1An,Aσ(n) induced by the permutation σ as
‘re-wiring’ according to σ, e.g.:
1A1,A3 ⊗ 1A2,A1 ⊗ 1A3,A4 ⊗ 1A4,A2 ≡
_~
The dotted box and the ‘'’-sign refer to the fact that the wires are different
from those we have seen so far, which represented systems. Here they encode a
relation which changes systems. Equation (1.5) now becomes:
=Ψ Ψ
_~
We indeed now truly exploit the fact that in the graphical language systems
appear in a certain order, which can be used to identify systems. Symmetry re-
lations which identify distinct identical systems now identify different positions
within the order. More on this ordering and identity of systems is in §1.4.
We now combine symmetry relations representing identical systems with the
notion of a process, to derive the crucial notion of an evolution:
Example: evolutions. By an evolution we mean a scenario only involving
causal composition and for which all maximal snapshots are identical in the
above sense. Consider such a scenario with the process f : A0 → B as its
resolution, and let Aη be a maximal snapshot distinct from A0. Now consider
the scenario that one obtains by restricting to those processes that happen
before Aη, including Aη itself, let the process fη : A0 → Aη be its resolution,
and now consider the symmetry relation:
eη := 1Aη,A ◦ fη : A0 → A0 .
If the collection of all labels η carries the structure of the real continuum we
obtain a generalization of the standard notion of an evolution in terms of a
one-parameter family of ‘things’, here symmetry relations, which, intuitively,
relate potential properties of a system at time η, here A0, to those at time 0.
Example: symmetry groups. The maps eη : A0 → A0 in the previous ex-
ample are special in that they relate a system to itself, while typically not being
identities. One could associate to each system a collection of such symmetry
endo-relations which are closed under ◦ and each of which comes with an in-
verse, i.e. for f : A→ A there is f−1 : A→ A such that f ◦f−1 = f−1 ◦f = 1A .
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Such a collection plays the role of the symmetry groups in existing theories. It
follows that a symmetry group of a system carries over to a symmetry group of
an identical, and that evolutions respect symmetries.
Example: variable causal structure. This example addresses a particular
challenge posed by Lucien Hardy at a lecture in Barbados, spring 2008 [107].
Thus far processes were required to respect some perceived causal structure.
However, several authors argue that a framework that stands a chance to be of
any use for describing quantum gravity should allow for variable causal structure
e.g. [106, 108]. Once we ‘solved’ Einstein’s equations in general relativity then
the causal structure is of course fixed, so varying causal structure doesn’t boil
down to merely dropping it, but rather to allow for a variety of causal structures.
This is what we will establish here, namely to introduce processes which have
the potential to adopt many different causal incarnations, while still maintaining
the key role of composition within the theory. In other words, a certain causal
incarnation becomes something like potential property.
For each system we introduce two symmetry relations:
x
A : I→ A∗ ⊗A and yA : A⊗A∗ → I ,
to which we respectively refer to as input-output reversal and output-input re-
versal. These are subject to the following equations:
(yA ⊗1A) ◦ (1A ⊗ xA) = 1A and (1A∗⊗yA) ◦ ( xA ⊗ 1A∗) = 1A∗ (1.6)
which state that reversing twice yields no reversal. For a process f : C ⊗A→ B
(resp. g : A → B ⊗ C) we can use reversal to produce a variation on it where
the input C (resp. output C) has become an output (resp. input) C∗ :
f˜ = (1C∗ ⊗ f) ◦ ( xC ⊗ 1A) : A→ C∗ ⊗B
g˜ = (1B⊗yC) ◦ (g ⊗ 1C∗) : A⊗ C∗ → B
Here, the ‘∗’ tells us that while A was an input (resp. output) for process f
(resp. g) that it is now converted into an output (resp. input). This is crucial
when composing f (resp. g) with other processes.
Putting this in pictures we set:
x
A ≡ and yA ≡
where the directions of the arrows represent the ∗’s. The equations then become:
=
and =
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and the converted processes depict as:
f˜ ≡ f and g˜ ≡ g
By a pre-causal process we mean a collection of potential processes which is
closed under reversal of all inputs and outputs. For example, graphically: f
 :=
 f , f , f , f

is such a pre-causal process. Similarly to how composition of processes could
be represented by directed graphs, one can show that composition of pre-causal
processes can be represented by undirected graphs:
z
x
hf
g
Indeed, by considering a node as representing a pre-causal process, that is, all
of its potential causal incarnations, we obtain:
f
g
=
_~
g
f g
f
=
g
f
~
~
_~
g~
f~
Consequently, the directions on arrows carry no content.
While the presentation of scenarios as nodes of undirected graphs is of course
more concise than as collections of causal incarnations, the latter has the con-
ceptual advantage that causal structure is attributed to processes. Since in our
setup these are the things that really ‘happen’, whereas systems only play a
supporting role, it is the processes which should carry the causal structure.
1.3.6 Vacuous relations: correcting denotational artifacts
Both processes and symmetry relations carry structural content of the theory
under consideration. We mention one more kind of relation of which the sole
purpose is to correct artifacts due to a particular choice of denotation. Above
we already pointed at the fact that when we denote separate composition either
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symbolically or diagrammatically this unavoidably comes with some ordering
due to the fact that the points of a line are totally ordered.
To undo this, we need to state that all orderings are equivalent. Therefore
we introduce for each pair of systems A1 and A2 an invertible relation σA1,A2
which exchanges the order:
σA1,A2 : A1 ⊗A2 → A2 ⊗A1 with σA2,A1 ◦ σA1,A2 = 1A1⊗A2 .
These relations then generate arbitrary permutations e.g.:22
: A1 ⊗A2 ⊗A3 ⊗A4 → A2 ⊗A4 ⊗A1 ⊗A3 .
To state that these exchanges of order are indeed vacuous we have to assert
that they do not affect the structural content of the theory, that is, the two
compositions. Firstly, separate compositions should be preserved:
σB1,B2 ◦ (f1 ⊗ f2) = (f2 ⊗ f1) ◦ σA1,A2 .
For example, for the above permutation of four systems we have:
f f f f2 4 1 3
f f f f1 2 3 4
=
That causal composition is also preserved then trivially follows:
σC1,C2◦(g1⊗g2)◦(f1⊗f2) = (g1⊗g2)◦σB1,B2◦(f2⊗f1) = (g1⊗g2)◦(f2⊗f1)◦σA1,A2 .
1.3.7 Summary of this section
Within the proposed framework a physical theory has the following ingredients:
• a collection of relations with two compositions ◦ and ⊗ thereon, subject
to an independence constraint, as well as additional equations that specify
for which scenarios the corresponding resolutions are equal ;
• certain relations called potential (or candidate) processes which will act as
the ‘actual physical substance’ of the theory, according to:
actual process
actual property
··
might happen
might be
;
Examples of processes are:
22Note the difference with the example of bosonic states earlier in this paper in that now
the wires relate a system with itself, just like identities do. They just shift the order. Hence:
_~ =
_~
where the straight wires in the dotted box stand for change of system.
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– states, effects and weights ,
– processes resulting from performing an operation ,
– feed-in-environment processes witnessing non-isolation, etc.
• certain relations called symmetry relations which carry additional struc-
ture of the theory ; examples of symmetry relations are:
– those that identify symmetries ,
– those that identify identical systems ,
– those that vary the causal structure, etc.
• certain relations called vacuous relations that carry no physical content
whatsoever but undo artifacts that are merely due to denotation.
Further below we will identify some more ingredients but first we will see how
we can cast these ones within standard mathematical structures.
1.4 The mathematical guise of physical theories
In set theory [38, 70] a class is a collection of which the members are defined by
a predicate which they all obey. For example, the class of groups is defined as
sets that come equipped with a binary and a unary operation which obey the
usual axioms of groups. By Russell’s paradox, which can restated as the fact
that the collection of all sets itself does not form a set, it immediately follows
that the collection of all groups together do not form a set, but a proper class.
Modeling concession 1. The collection of all systems together forms a class
and the collection of all relations of the same type forms a set.
This concession reflects standard mathematical practice,23 and hence is es-
sential when trying to provide the ‘informal’ ideas in the previous section with
a more standard formal backbone, either in terms of axiomatics or in terms of
more concrete models obeying this axiomatics.24
1.4.1 Axiomatics
The physical framework outlined above, when subjected to the stated mod-
elling concession 1, can be represented as a so-called strict symmetric monoidal
category. For a more detailed discussion we refer the reader again to [58].
23There exist proposals to generalize this, e.g. the universes as in [36]§1.1.
24We refer the reader to [58] for a more detailed discussion of the sense in which we use
‘axiomatics’ and ‘concrete models’, where rather than ‘axiomatics’ we used the term ‘abstract’.
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Definition. A strict symmetric monoidal category C consists of a class of
objects |C|, for each pair of objects A,B ∈ |C| a set of morphisms C(A,B),25
a privileged unit object I ∈ |C|, for each object A ∈ |C| a privileged identity
morphism 1A ∈ C(A,A), and the following operations and axioms:
• an associative binary operation ⊗ on |C| with unit I ;
• an associative binary operation ⊗ on ⋃A,B C(A,B) with unit 1I, and with
f1 ⊗ f2 ∈ C(A1 ⊗A2, B1 ⊗B2) for f1 ∈ C(A1, B1) and f2 ∈ C(A2, B2) ;
• a partial associative binary operation ◦ on ⋃A,B C(A,B) restricted to
pairs in C(B,C)×C(A,B) where A,B,C ∈ |C| are arbitrary, and for all
A,B ∈ |C|, all f ∈ C(A,B) have right identity 1A and left identity 1B .
Moreover, for all A,B,A1, B1, C1, A2, B2, C2 ∈ |C|, f1 ∈ C(A1, B1), g1 ∈
C(B1, C1), f2 ∈ C(A2, B2) and g2 ∈ C(B2, C2) we have:
(g1 ◦ f1)⊗ (g2 ◦ f2) = (g1 ⊗ g2) ◦ (f1 ⊗ f2) and 1A1 ⊗ 1A2 = 1A1⊗A2 .
Finally, for all A1, A2 ∈ |C| there is a privileged morphism
σA1,A2 ∈ C(A1 ⊗A2, A2 ⊗A1) with σA2,A1 ◦ σA1,A2 = 1A1⊗A2
such that for all A1, A2, B1, B2 ∈ |C|, f1 ∈ C(A1, B1), f2 ∈ C(A2, B2) we have:
σB1,B2 ◦ (f1 ⊗ f2) = (f2 ⊗ f1) ◦ σA1,A2 . (1.7)
This is quite a mouthful but there are very short more elegant ways to say
this which rely on higher-level category theory.26 It is also a well-known fact
that these strict monoidal categories are in exact correspondence with the kind
of graphical calculi that we introduced to describe relations [128]. While the
use of this calculi traces back to Penrose’s work in the early seventies [156],
they only became a genuine formal discipline within the context of monoidal
categories with the work of Joyal and Street [128] in the nineties. However, the
first comprehensive detailed account on them was only produced this year by
Selinger [172], which provides an even nicer presentation. We say something
more about these graphical presentations below in Section 1.4.3.
We now show how the above discussed framework, subject to the modeling
concession, can be interpreted in the language of strict symmetric monoidal
25Such a set C(A,B) of morphisms is usually referred to as a homset.
26For example, a (not-necessarily strict) symmetric monoidal category, which takes a lot
more space to explicitly define than a strict one (see [147, 8, 16] for the usual definition and
[58] for a discussion), is an internal commutative monoid in the category of all categories.
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categories. Recall here that an isomorphism in a category is a morphism f :
A→ B which has an inverse, precisely in the sense of (1.3).
Systems are represented by objects of the symmetric monoidal category,
relations by morphisms, and the compositions have been given matching nota-
tions. We discuss the role of some of the privileged morphisms:
• The symmetry natural isomorphism27
{σA1,A2 : A1 ⊗A2 → A2 ⊗A1 | A1, A2 ∈ |C|} .
plays the role of the symmetry relation that undoes the unavoidable a
priori ordering on systems when composing them with ⊗.
• There may be several occurrences of the same object within a string of
tensored objects e.g. A ⊗ A. To align this with the fact that all systems
occurring in such an expression must we independent, we either:
c1 not assign any meaning to all objects and morphisms of the symmet-
ric monoidal category, but rather consider a subcategory of it with
a partial tensor, an approach which is currently developed in [53];
c2 represent distinct identical systems by the same object, which allows
for the two A’s in A⊗A to be interpreted as independent.
Above, c1 and c2 can also be seen as modeling concessions.
Example: compactness models variable causal structure. A compact
(closed) category [130, 131] is a symmetric monoidal category in which every
object A has a dual A∗, that is, there are morphisms xA : I → A∗ ⊗ A and
yA : A ⊗ A∗ → I satisfying equations (1.6). Equivalence classes of morphism
then enable to model variable causal structure as indicated above.
Example: symmetry and compactness in communication protocols.
Above, the ‘symmetry’ and ‘compact’ structure represented relations which re-
spectively undo the order on systems within scenarios or a causal structure.
These morphisms can also play a more constructive role as special kinds of
communication processes. It was this which initially motivated the use of com-
pact closed categories to model quantum protocols in [6]. To this end we will
treat the ordering of objects relative to the tensor as genuine locations in space-
time, represented by two agents, respectively named Ali and Bob. Then the
morphism: σA1,A2 : A1 ⊗ A2 → A2 ⊗ A1 means that the agents exchange their
27The significance of the word ‘natural’ here precisely boils down to validity of (1.7).
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physical systems. We can represent the agents by regions in the plane which
extend vertically i.e. in the direction of causal composition:
(︷ ︸︸ ︷) ⊗ (︷ ︸︸ ︷)
Ali Bob
If the category is moreover compact closed then by the axioms of compact
closure we have the following equation between scenarios:
BobAli
=
Bob Ali
which can be interpreted as a correctness proof of post-selected quantum tele-
portation. Here, xA : I→ A∗⊗A represents a Bell-state and yA : A⊗A∗ → I
represents a post-selected Bell-effect. A more detailed analysis as well as more
sophisticated variations on the same theme which involve varying the entangled
state and allowing for non-determinism of the effects are in [6, 44, 48, 60, 59, 65].
Example: explicit agents. While the previous example gives a very concise
presentations of protocols, it is not completely consistent with our earlier inter-
pretation of symmetry and compactness as symmetry relations. One possible
manner to accommodate the use of these morphisms both as symmetry rela-
tions as well as processes is by explicitly introducing agents. To model agents,
respectively named Ali and Bob, we take objects to be pairs consisting of an
entry which represents the physical system together with an entry which rep-
resents the agent that possesses that system for that snapshot. Morphisms will
be pairs consisting of the manner in which physical systems are processed, as
well as specification of which agents possess it at the beginning and the end
of the processes. We provide a rough idea of how naively this can formally be
established, skimming over certain technical details. Take the product category :
C× FSMAgents
of the symmetric monoidal category C in which we model physical systems, and
the free symmetric monoidal category over a category Agents,28 which has two
28An overview of free constructions for the categories which we consider here is in [2].
The objects of the free symmetric monoidal category FSMD over a category D are finite
lists of objects of D and the morphisms are finite lists of morphisms of D together with a
permutation of objects. Concretely we can write these as σpi ◦ (f : A1 → B1, . . . , An → Bn) :
(A1, . . . , An) → (Bpi(1), . . . , Bpi(n)) where pi : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} is a permutation. The
permutation component alone provides the symmetry natural isomorphism.
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objects Ali and Bob and only identities as morphisms:
Agents(Ali, Ali) = {1Ali} Agents(Ali,Bob) = ∅
Agents(Bob,Bob) = {1Bob} Agents(Bob,Ali) = ∅
The category C×FSMAgents inherits symmetric monoidal structure component-
wise from C and FSMAgents, with a symmetry morphism now of the form:
(σA1,A2 , σpi) : (A1, Ali)⊗ (A2, Bob)→ (A2, Bob)⊗ (A1, Ali) ,
where pi is the (only) non-trivial permutation of two elements. This now repre-
sents the symmetry relation that undoes the ordering on objects. On the other
hand, the exchange process can now be differently represented, namely by:
(σA1,A2 , 1Ali⊗Bob) : (A1, Ali)⊗ (A2, Bob)→ (A2, Ali)⊗ (A1, Bob) ,
So we have distinct morphisms representing both symmetry relations and pro-
cesses, and the same can be done for post-selected quantum teleportation.
1.4.2 Concrete models
Thus far we treated categories as a structure in their own right, and conse-
quently, also the diagrammatic calculi. However, to realize existing theories
such as quantum theory, we need to consider concrete models of these. That is,
the objects constitute some kind of mathematical strucure, for example Hilbert
spaces, while the morphisms constitute mappings between these, for example
linear maps. The monoidal tensor is then a binary construction on these.
But what we obtain in this manner are not strict symmetric monoidal cat-
egories, but strict——— symmetric monoidal categories. In particular, we lose
(strict) associativity and (strict) unitality of the tensor:
A⊗ (B ⊗ C) 6= (A⊗B)⊗ C I⊗A 6= A A⊗ I 6= A
f ⊗ (g ⊗ h) 6= (f ⊗ g)⊗ h 1I ⊗ f 6= f f ⊗ 1I 6= f .
This is a consequence of the fact that in set-theory:
(x, (y, z)) 6= ((x, y), z) (∗, x) 6= x (x, ∗) 6= x .
For a detailed discussion of this issue we refer to [58]. We mention here that the
main consequence of this is the fact that in any standard textbook the definition
of a symmetric monoidal category may stretch many pages. The reason is that
in one way or another we need to articulate that A⊗ (B⊗C) and (A⊗B)⊗C
are in a very special way related, similarly to how A⊗B and B ⊗A relate was
captured above by the symmetry ‘natural isomorphisms’.
Five examples of models of symmetric monoidal categories are:
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• (F)Set:=
– Objects:= (finite) sets
– Morphisms:= functions between these
– Tensor:= the Cartesian product of sets
• (F)Rel:=
– Objects:= (finite) sets
– Morphisms:= (ordinary mathematical) relations between these
– Tensor:= the Cartesian product of sets
• (F)Hilb:=
– Objects:= (finite dimensional) Hilbert spaces
– Morphisms:= linear maps between these
– Tensor:= the Hilbert space tensor product
• WP(F)Hilb:=
– Objects:= (finite dimensional) Hilbert spaces
– Morphisms:= linear maps between these up to a global phase
– Tensor:= the Hilbert space tensor product
• CP(F)Hilb:=
– Objects:= (finite dimensional) Hilbert spaces
– Morphisms:= completely positive maps between these29
– Tensor:= the Hilbert space tensor product
The reason for restricting to finite sets/dimensions is explained in Section 1.4.3.
Mappings from one of these models, which take each object A ∈ |C| to an
object FA ∈ |C| and which take each morphism f ∈ C(A,B) to a morphism
Ff ∈ C(FA,FB), and which preserve the full symmetric monoidal structure,
are called strict monoidal functors. If a strict monoidal functor is injective on
homsets it is called faithful. These strict monoidal functors allow one to relate
29These can for example be defined in terms of the Kraus representation f :: ρ 7→∑i A†iρAi
on the space of density matrices, where each Ai is an n× n-matrix [69, 134].
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different models to each other. For example, there are the identity-on-objects
faithful strict monoidal functors:30
Ffunc : Set ↪→ Rel Fpure : WPFHilb ↪→ CPFHilb (1.8)
as well as object-squaring (i.e. H 7→ H⊗H) faithful strict monoidal functors:31
Fcp : CPFHilb ↪→ FHilb Fcp ◦ Fpure : WPFHilb ↪→ FHilb . (1.9)
But in our view the physical theories should primarily be formulated ax-
iomatically rather than in terms of these models, since it is at the axiomatic
level that the conceptually meaningful entities live, and hence it is on those that
structures should be imposed, rather than providing concrete presentations of
them which typically would carry more information than necessary/meaningful.
Ultimately, one would like to equip a strict symmetric monoidal category with
enough structure so that we can derive all observable physical phenomena,
without the necessity to provide a concrete model.
Then, the choice of a particular model such as WPFHilb can be seen as a
choice of coordinate system which might enable one to solve a certain problem
better than other coordinate systems. Hence for us the non-strictness of the
mathematical models is an unfortunate artifact, while the strictness which we
took for granted when setting up the formalism, which is also implicitly present
in the diagrammatic calculi, reflect the true state of affairs.
The category FHilb is the one that we typically have in mind in relation to
quantum mechanics. But other models may provide the same features. These
other models, in particular those of a more combinatorial nature, might give
some useful guidance towards, say, a theory of quantum gravity. Also, discrete
models are also extremely useful for computer simulations.
1.4.3 Where axioms and models meet: a theorem
Consider the following four devices:
(1) Axiomatically described strict symmetric monoidal categories, possibly
equipped with additional structure.
(2) Axiomatically described strict——— symmetric monoidal categories (for which
we refer to the many available textbooks and survey papers [147, 8, 16])
possibly equipped with additional structure.
30To see this for WPFHilb ↪→ CPFHilb, note that WPFHilb can be presented as a
category with the same objects as FHilb but with maps of the form f⊗ f¯ : H⊗H → H′⊗H′
(where f : H → H′ is any linear map) as the morphisms in WPFHilb(H,H′) [45]. Similarly,
also CPFHilb can be presented as a category with the homset CPFHilb(H,H′) containing
maps of type H⊗H → H′ ⊗H′, but now more general ones [171].
31This again relies on the presentations mentioned in the previous footnote.
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(3) The diagrammatical calculus of strict symmetric monoidal categories (of
which precise descriptions can be found in [128, 171, 172]) possibly equipped
with additional graphical elements.
(4) The concrete category FHilb.
If we establish an equation in one of these, what do we know about the validity
of equations in one of the others?
Theorem. An equation between two scenarios in the language of symmetric
monoidal categories follows from the axioms of symmetric monoidal categories,
if and only if, the corresponding equation between two scenarios in the lan-
guage of strict symmetric monoidal categories follows from the axioms of strict
symmetric monoidal categories, if and only if, the corresponding equation in
the graphical language follows from isomorphisms of diagrams.
The reader who wants to understand the nitty-gritty of this statement can
consult [172]. The main point that we wish to make here is that for all practical
purposes, strict symmetric monoidal categories, general symmetric monoidal
categories, and the corresponding graphical language, are essentially one-and-
the-same thing! The first ‘if and only if’ is either referred to as MacLane’s
strictification theorem or coherence for symmetric monoidal categories [147, 58].
So what about the concrete category FHilb? As it is an example of a
symmetric monoidal category, by the above result, whatever we prove about a
strict one, or within the diagrammatic language, will automatically also hold
for FHilb. Obviously, one would expect the converse not to hold since we are
only considering about a very particular symmetric monoidal category.
However, recently Selinger [173] elaborated on an existing result due to
Hasegawa, Hofmann and Plotkin [111] to show that there is in fact a converse
statement, provided one adds some extra structure.
Definition. A dagger compact (closed) category32 [6, 7, 171] is a compact
(closed) category C together with a dagger functor, that is, for all A,B ∈ |C|
a mapping
†A,B : C(A,B)→ C(B,A) ,
which is such that †A,B and †B,A are mutually inverse, and which moreover pre-
serves the composition and the tensor structure, including units and identities.
32Strict dagger compact (closed) categories appeared in the work of Baez and Dolan [15]
as a special case for n = 1 and k = 3 of k-tuply monoidal n-categories with duals.
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Graphically, the dagger functor merely flips things upside-down [171, 48]:
f h
g
z
x
_~
z
x
hf
g
†
z
x
h
†
†
†
f
g
†
†
z
g
h
x
f
_~
†
In the representation on the left we made the boxes asymmetric to distinguish
between a morphism and its dagger. In the one on the right, since nodes have no
a priori orientation in the plane, we used an explicit involution on the symbols.
Theorem. An equation between two scenarios in the language of dagger com-
pact categories follows from the axioms of dagger compact categories, if and
only if, the corresponding equation in the graphical language follows from iso-
morphisms of diagrams, if and only if, an equation between two scenarios in
the language of dagger compact (closed) categories holds in FHilb.
Since there are faithful strict monoidal functors which embed WPFHilb
as well as CPFHilb within FHilb the correspondence with the diagrammatic
language also carries over to these models.
The question whether we can carry this through for richer languages than
that of dagger compact categories remains open. Still, the language of dagger
compact categories already captures many important concepts: trace, trans-
pose, conjugate, adjoint, inner-product, unitarity, (complete) positivity [48].
While admittedly, the conceptual significance of the dagger is still being
discussed,33 besides compactness, the dagger is what truly gives a theory it’s
relational character. In particular, it is a key property of the category FRel
which the category FSet fails to admit: each relation has a converse relation.
This is also the reason why FRel and FHilb are so alike in terms of their
33Also mathematically, there are some issues with the dagger to which some refer as ‘Evil’.
The main problem is that the structure of the dagger, in particular its strict action on objects,
is not preserved under so-called categorical equivalences. This has been the subject of a recent
long discussion on the categories mailing list involving all the big shots of the area.
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categorical structure, while FRel and FSet are very different in terms of cate-
gorical structure, despite the fact that FRel and FSet have the same objects,
the same compositions, and that the morphisms of FSet are a subset of those
of FRel.34 Intuitively, the reason for this is that linear maps (when conceived
as matrices) can be seen as some kind of generalized relations, in that they do
not just encode whether two things relate, but also in which manner that they
relate, by means of a complex number. In contrast to the many who conceive
quantum theory as a generalized probability theory, for us it is rather a theory
of generalized relations, the latter now to be taken in its mathematical sense.
Example: Spekkens’ toy qubit theory. In [175] Spekkens suggested dag-
ger duality as an axiom for a class of theories which would generalize his toy
qubit theory [174]. The concrete presentation of Spekkens’ qubit theory as a
dagger compact category Spek is in [50, 51, 82]. This presentation enabled a
clear comparison with a dagger compact category Stab which encodes stabilizer
qubit theory, from which it emerged that the only difference between the toy
qubit theory and stabilizer qubit theory is the different group structure of the
phase groups [51],35 a concept introduced by Duncan and the author in [49].
We are also in a position explain why we restricted to finite sets/dimensions.
While Rel is compact closed and has a dagger structure, Hilb is neither com-
pact closed nor has a dagger.36 While some may take this as an objection to the
dagger compact structure, we think that the fact that Hilb fails to be dagger
compact may be an artifact of the Hilbert space structure, rather than a feature
of nature. Having said this, we do agree that dagger compactness surely isn’t
the end of the story. In particular, we would like to conceive also the dagger as
some kind of relation, rather than as an operation on a category as a whole.37
1.4.4 Non-isolation in the von Neumann quantum model
In order to assert that a physical theory includes non-isolated (i.e open) systems
for every system A ∈ |C| we considered a designated process >A : A→ I with:
>A ⊗>B = >A⊗B and >I = 1I , (1.10)
34A detailed analysis of the similarities between FRel and FHilb and the differences be-
tween FRel and FSet is in [58]. To mention one difference: in FSet the Cartesian product
behaves like a non-linear conjunction while in FRel it behaves like a linear conjunction.
35These correspond to the two available four-element Abelian groups, the four-element
cyclic group for stabilizer qubit theory and the Klein four group for the toy qubit theory.
36We do obtain a dagger when restricting to bounded linear maps and there are also
category-theoretic technical tricks to have something very similar to compact structure [5].
37There are manners to do this but we won’t go into them here.
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which are such that for all A ∈ |C| the mappings:
>A ◦ − : C(I, A)→ C(I, I)
assign the weights of each of these states. We now present a result which
characterizes an additional condition that these processes have to satisfy relative
to a collection of isolated (or closed) processes in order that:
open processes
closed processes
··
mixed state quantum theory
pure state quantum theory
··
CPFHilb
WPFHilb
.
That is, in words, if we know that our theory of closed systems is ordinary
quantum theory of closed systems, what do we have to require from the feed-
into-environment processes such that the whole theory corresponds to quantum
theory of open systems? This condition turns out to be non-trival.
Consider a symmetric monoidal category C with feed-into-environment pro-
cesses, that is, for each A ∈ |C| a designated morphism >A : A → I satisfying
(1.10). Assume that it contains a sub symmetric monoidal category Cpure, and
we will refer to the morphisms in it as pure. By a purification of a morphism of
f : A→ B in C we mean a morphism fpure : A→ B ⊗ C in Cpure such that:
(1B ⊗>C) ◦ fpure = f . (1.11)
We say that Cpure generates C whenever each morphism in C can be purified.
Example: purification in probabilistic theories. The power of purifica-
tion as a postulate is exploited by Chiribella, D’Ariano and Perinotti in [41].
By combining the results in [171] with those of [47] we obtain:
Theorem. If Cpure ' WPFHilb generates C, and if for the usual dagger
functor on WPFHilb we have for all f : C → A and g : C → B in WPFHilb:
>A ◦ f = >B ◦ g ⇐⇒ f† ◦ f = g† ◦ g , (1.12)
then C ' CPFHilb.
More generally, for any pair C and Cpure the conditions (1.10, 1.11) and a
slight generalization of (1.12) together allow one to construct the whole category
C from morphisms in Cpure by only using the dagger symmetric monoidal
structure, together with a canonical inclusion of in Cpure within C, a result
which is obtained by combining the results in [171], [47] and [46]. If the category
C is compact closed, as it is the case for WPFHilb, then (1.12) does suffice.
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In this case, following Selinger in [171], the open processes in the constructed
category CPC all take the form:
puref fpure
for some fpure : A→ B ⊗ C in Cpure, where the left-right reflection represents
the composite of the dagger and transposition, explicitly:
=fpure pure
f
In WPFHilb this is nothing but complex conjugation (see [48] for more details
on this). The subcategory of pure processes consists of those of the form:
puref fpure
Graphically, condition (1.12) can then be rewritten as:
fpure
=
gpure ⇔ fpure
=
gpure
fpure gpure
and from it immediately follows, setting g := 1A, that:
fpure
= ⇔ fpure
=
fpure
Calling processes fpure which obey
f†pure ◦ fpure = 1A
isometries, it then follows that isometries are exactly those processes which
leave the feed-into-environment processes invariant.
Condition (1.12) can in the compact case be equivalently presented as:
=
puref fpure pureg gpurefpure
=
gpure ⇔
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which provides a direct translation between Selinger’s presentation of WPFHilb
and one which relies on the feed-into-environment processes. The more general
form of the non-compact case mentioned above is now obtained by ‘undoing’
all compact morphisms which requires introduction of symmetry morphisms:
=
puref
fpure
=
gpure ⇔
puref pureg
pureg
.
Importantly, both (WP)C and CPC are symmetric monoidal (and compact)
if C is, so CPC admits a graphical language in its own right without reference
to the underlying symmetric monoidal category C.
1.4.5 Non-isolation and causality
If we restrict to processes that ‘happen with certainty’ then, as shown by
Chiriballa, D’Ariano and Perinotti, uniqueness of a deterministic effect en-
forces causality in the sense that states of compound systems have well-defined
marginals [41]. In category-theoretic terms, this uniqueness means that I is
terminal, that is, for each object A there is a unique morphism of type A→ I,
which will then play the role of >A. It then immediately follows that
>A⊗B = >A ⊗>B ,
and hence, that there are no entangled effects. The manner in which:
• connectedness in graphical calculus as expressing causal connections, and
• this notion of causality in terms of a terminal object
are related is currently being explored in collaboration with Ray Lal [53].
1.5 Classicality and measurement
For us, a classicality entity is one for which there are no limitations for to be
shared among many parties, that is, using quantum information terminology,
which can be broadcast [21]. It is witnessed by a collection of processes which
establish this sharing/broadcasting. To give an example, while an unknown
quantum state cannot be cloned [71, 187], this scientific fact itself is of course
available to every individual of the scientific community, by means of writing a
paper about it and distributing copies of the journal in which it appears.
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So our notion of classicality makes no direct reference to anything ‘material’,
but to the ability of a logical flow of information to admit ‘branching’. In
relational terms, it will be witnessed by the relation that identifies the branches
as being identical. The power of this idea for describing quantum information
tasks is discussed in a paper with Simon Perdrix [63], where it is also discussed
that decoherence can be seen as a material embodiment of this idea.
Our explorations have indeed made us realize that rather than starting from
a classical theory which one subjects to a quantization procedure in order to
produce a theory which can describe quantum systems, one obtains an elegant
compositional mathematical framework when, starting from a ‘quantum’ uni-
verse of processes, one identifies classicality in this manner. Put in slightly more
mathematical terms, citing John Baez in TWF 268 [14] on our work:
“Mathematicians in particular are used to thinking of the quantum
world as a mathematical structure resting on foundations of classical
logic: first comes set theory, then Hilbert spaces on top of that.
But what if it’s really the other way around? What if classical
mathematics is somehow sitting inside quantum theory? The world
is quantum, after all.”
This idea of “classical objects living in a quantum world governed by quantum
rules” was introduced by Pavlovic and myself in [61] and further elaborated on
in [62, 57, 59]. In terms of symmetric monoidal categories, we are speaking
the language of certain kinds of so-called internal Frobenius algebras [40, 61,
62]. Interestingly, these Frobenius algebras appeared first in the literature in
Carboni and Walter’s axiomatization of the category Rel [40].
1.5.1 Classicality
Below, when we (slightly abusively) denote several systems by the same symbol,
we think of them as distinct identical systems and not as the same one.
The processes which establishes the shareability that is characteristic for
classicality implements an ‘equality’ between the distinct instances of that en-
tity, and we depict them in a ‘spider-like’ manner:
Ξn,m ≡
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
....
....
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
: X ⊗ . . .⊗X︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
→ X ⊗ . . .⊗X︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
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By transitivity of equality it immediately follows that:
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
=
.
One may distinguish two kinds of classicality. The more restrictive first kind,
called controlled (or closed or pure) requires sharing to be within the domain of
consideration. This is explicitly realized by:
Ξ1,1 = 1X i.e.
=
,
The second kind of classicality, called uncontrolled (or open or mixed) allows
sharing to be outside our domain of consideration, which in the light of the
above composition rule is realized by:
Ξo1,0 = >X i.e.
=
,
since then we obain:
(>X ⊗ 1X⊗...⊗X) ◦Ξon,m = Ξon,m−1 i.e.
....
....
=
....
....
,
i.e. uncontrolled sharing is invariant under feed-into-environment processes.
These two forms of classicality may be naturally related to each other by
introducing feed-into-environment processes within the closed spiders, or dually
put, by considering closed spiders as purifications of the open ones:
(>X ⊗ 1X⊗...⊗X) ◦Ξn,m = Ξon,m−1 i.e.
....
....
=
....
....
.
which can in fact be summarized as the following two equations:
=
=
We can identify some special examples:
• erasing := Ξ1,0 ≡
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• cloning := Ξ1,2 ≡
• correlating := Ξ0,2 ≡
• comparing := Ξ2,0 ≡
• matching := Ξ2,1 ≡
• either := Ξ0,1 ≡
Conceptually, it is more than fair to cast doubt on physical meaningfulness
of closed spiders. To see this it suffices to consider the erasing operation in
the light of Landauer’s principle [140, 150]. Also, when thinking of a cloning
operation then one usually would assume some ancillary state onto which one
clones, and this ancillary state by the very definition of state is an open process:
U
=
ψ
Still it is useful to retain the closed spiders as an idealized concept given that
their behavioral specifications, exactly matches the well-understood mathemat-
ical gadget of commutative Frobenius algebras (see Section 1.5.4).
A particularly relevant open spider is the purification of copying:
• broadcasting := Ξo1,1 ≡
While it has the type of an identity it is genuinely non-trivial.
Example: cloning and broadcasting in quantum information. A hint
why the above may indeed characterize classicality on-the-nose comes from the
no-cloning theorem [71, 187] which states that the only quantum states which
can be copied by a single operation have to be orthogonal. Maximal sets of these
jointly copy-able states make up an orthonormal basis i.e. a (pure) classical
‘slice’ of quantum theory. Similarly, the no-broadcasting theorem [21] states
that the only quantum states which can be broadcast by a single operation
correspond to a collection of density matrices that are diagonal in the same
orthonormal basis. This table summarizes cloneability/broadcastability:
pure classical mixed classical pure quantum mixed quantum
broadcastable: yes YES no no
cloneable: yes NO no no
Deep Beauty—Coecke (rev. yyyy Mmm dd) 45
Conversely, for an orthonormal basis {|i〉}i of H the corresponding broadcast
operation is the following completely positive map:
|i〉〈j| 7→ δij |i〉〈i| .
Clearly, this completely positive map totally destroys coherence, hence broad-
casting is physically embodied by decoherence. Decoherence can indeed be seen
as ‘sharing with (cf. coupling to) the environment’.
Given that in quantum information both copying and broadcasting enable
to characterize an orthonormal basis, the question then remains to define can-
didate cloning/broadcasting operations in a manner that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between such operations and orthonormal bases. That is ex-
actly what we did above, as the theorem stated below confirms.
Theorem. In (WP)FHilb the above defined families
X = {Ξn,m | n,m ∈ N}
of closed spiders are in bijective correspondence with orthogonal bases. If we
moreover have that Ξn,m = Ξ
†
m,n for all n,m then this basis is orthonormal.
To show this we need to combine Steve Lack’s (highly abstract) account on
spiders [136] (of which a more accessible direct presentation is in [57]) with a
result obtained by Pavlovic, Vicary and myself [62] (see Section 1.5.4).
This result states that all non-degenerate observables can indeed be bijec-
tively represented by these sharing processes. Now we establish that spiders
are also expressive enough to associate a corresponding ‘classical slice’ of the
universe of all processes to each family X . We assert classicality of a process
by imposing invariance under broadcasting/decoherences [59].38 The copyabil-
ity of pure classical data can be used to assert deterministic processes. We
conveniently set oX = Ξo1,1 ∈ X and δX = Ξ1,2 ∈ X .
Definition. A classical process is a process of the form:
oY ◦ f ◦ oX ≡ f
38This is akin to Blume-Kohout and Zurek’s quantum Darwinism [30, 189].
Deep Beauty—Coecke (rev. yyyy Mmm dd) 46
where f : X → Y can be an arbitrary process. Evidently, classical processes
can be equivalently defined as processes f : X → Y which satisfy:
oY ◦ f ◦ oX = f that is f = f .
Such a classical process is normalized or stochastic if we have:
>Y ◦ f = >X that is f = .
and it is deterministic if we moreover have that:
δY ◦ f = (f ⊗ f) ◦ δX that is
=
f
ff
.
Theorem. In CPFHilb normalized classical processes exactly correspond to
the usual notion of stochastic maps, that is, matrices with positive real entries
such that all columns add up to one, and deterministic processes correspond to
functions, that is, matrices with exactly one 1-entry in each column.
This result was shown by Paquette, Pavlovic and myself in [59] where many
other species of classical processes (doubly stochastic, partial processes, rela-
tions, ...) are defined in a similar manner.39
Challenge. Develop the above without any reference to closed spiders.
1.5.2 Measurement
Once we have identified these classical entities (provided they exist at all), we
may wish to represent general processes relative to this entity. This is obviously
what observables (or measurements) in quantum theory aim to do. One thing
we know for a fact is that it is not possible to represent the whole universe of
processes by means of such an entity. So what is the best we could aim for?
By a probe we mean a process
(1B ⊗ oX ) ◦m : A→ B ⊗X that is .
39We adopted Carboni and Walters’ axiomatization of the category of relations [40], which
also involved introducing the Frobenius law, to the probabilistic and the quantum case.
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We call it a non-demolition probe if A and B are identical systems, which we
denote by setting A = B, and we call it a demolition probe if B is I. By a von
Neumann probe we mean a non-demolition one which is such that:
(m⊗ 1X) ◦m = (1A ⊗ δX ) ◦m that is
=
(1.13)
where we used colors to distinguish the systems A and X for the reader’s con-
venience. There is a very straightforward interpretation to (1.13):
• Applying the same probe twice, is equal to applying it once and then
copying the output. More intuitively put, the A-output after the first
application is such that the probe produces the same X-output (and also
the same A-output) after a second application. This means that there is
strict relationship between the A-output and the X-output for that probe.
Set aX= Ξ2,0 ∈ X and eX = Ξ1,0 ∈ X .
Theorem. In (WP)FHilb von Neumann probes exactly correspond with spec-
tra of mutually orthogonal idempotents {Pi}, that is:
Pi ◦ Pj = δij · Pi .
If we moreover have that this probe is self-adjoint :
m† = (1A ⊗ δX ) ◦ (1A⊗ aX ) that is
=
(1.14)
then these idempotents are orthogonal projectors, that is:
P†i = Pi ,
and if:
(1A ⊗ eX ) ◦m = 1A that is
=
(1.15)
then this spectrum is exhaustive i.e.
∑
i Pi = 1H.
This result was shown by Pavlovic and myself in [61].
Challenge. Develop the above without any reference to closed spiders.
Challenge. Express the Geneva School’s properties within this framework.
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1.5.3 Classicality in the von Neumann quantum model
We now discuss how classicality fits within the model of the environment (i.e. open
systems) of Section 1.4.4. First note that classicality in the above sense auto-
matically yields self-dual (i.e. X = X∗) compactness:
=
=
In CPC decoherences oX take the following shape:
=
and consequently classical operations take the shape:
=
puref fpure gpure
for some process g : X → Y . Hence we obtain:
classical
non-classical
··
one wire
two wires
.
This fact seems to be closely related to Hardy’s axiom K = N2 [105], which in
turn is closely related to Barrett’s local tomography assumption [23].
The interpretation of (1.15) in the light of (1.13) and (1.14) is intriguing:
BOBALI
=
=
CP
=
= =
=
=
CP
BOB
The left upper picture articulates a protocol where Ali and Bob share a Bell-
state and Ali performs a measurement on it. We are interested in the resulting
state at Bob’s end, and therefore we feed Ali’s outputs into the environment.
Using (1.13), (1.14) and in particular also (1.15) within the CP-representation it
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then follows that what Bob sees is the dagger of a feed-into-environment process,
that is, a maximally mixed state. Hence this protocol provides Bob with no
knowledge whatsoever, hence not violating no-faster-than-light-signaling.
Challenge. Develop the above without any reference to closed spiders. Then
relate this to Hardy’s and D’Arianio’s research programs.
1.5.4 The algebra of classical behaviors
The above seems to have very little to do with the structures we usually en-
counter in mathematics, and quantum theory in particular. We will now relate
it to ‘semi-familiar’ mathematical structures, which are the ones that enable to
establish the relation with orthonormal bases mentioned above.
Commutative monoids and commutative comonoids
A commutative monoid is a set A with a binary map
− • − : A×A→ A
which is commutative, associative and unital i.e
(a • b) • c = a • (b • c) a • b = b • a a • 1 = a .
In other words, which may appeal more to the physicist, it is a group without
inverses. Note that we could also define a monoid as a one object category.
Slightly changing the •-notation to
µ : A×A→ A
for which we now have
µ(µ(a, b), c) = µ(a, µ(b, c)) µ(a, b) = µ(b, a) µ(a, 1) = a ,
enables us to write these conditions in a manner that makes no reference any-
more to the elements a, b, c ∈ A, namely:
µ ◦ (µ× 1A) = µ ◦ (1A × µ) µ = µ ◦ σ µ ◦ (1A × u) = 1A
with:
σ : A×A→ A×A :: (a, b) 7→ (b, a) u : {∗} → A :: ∗ 7→ 1
where {∗} is any singleton. This perspective emphasizes how the map µ ‘inter-
acts’ with itself, as opposed to how it ‘acts’ on elements, which clearly brings
us closer to the process view advocated in this paper.
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This change of perspective also allows us to define a new concept merely by
reversing the order of all compositions and types. Concretely, a cocommutative
comonoid is a set A with two maps:
δ : A→ A×A and e : A→ {∗}
which is cocommutative, coassociative and counital i.e.:
(δ × 1A) ◦ δ = (1A × δ) ◦ δ δ = σ ◦ δ (1A × e) ◦ δ = 1A .
Obviously there are many well-known examples of monoids, typically monoids
with additional structure e.g. groups. Another one is the two-element set {0, 1}
equipped with the ‘and’-monoid:
∧ : {0, 1} × {0, 1} → {0, 1} ::

(0, 0) 7→ 0
(0, 1) 7→ 0
(1, 0) 7→ 0
(1, 1) 7→ 1
u∧ : {∗} → {0, 1} :: ∗ 7→ 1 .
Given that from the above perspective monoids and comonoids are very similar
things, why do we never encounter comonoids in a standard algebra textbook?
Let us first look at an example of such a comonoid, just to show that such
things do exists. Let X be a any set and
δ : X → X ×X :: x 7→ (x, x) e : X → {∗} :: x 7→ ∗ .
The map δ copies the elements of X, while e erases them. Here coassociativity
means that if we wish obtain three copies of something, then after first making
two copies it doesn’t matter which of these two we copy again. Cocommutativity
tells us that after copying we exchange the two copies we still have the same.
Counitality tells us that if we first copy and then erase one of the copies, this
is the same as doing nothing.
Now, the reason why you won’t encounter any comonoids in a standard
algebra textbook is simply because this example is the only example of a com-
mutative comonoid, and hence it carries no real content, i.e. it freely arises
from the underlying set. But the reason for the trivial nature of commutative
comonoids is the fact of the following being functions:
µ : A×A→ A δ : A→ A×A u : {∗} → A e : A→ {∗} .
In other words, µ and δ are morphisms in the category FSet. While the con-
cept of a commutative monoid is interesting in FSet, that of a cocommutative
comonoid isn’t in FSet. However, if we put the above definition in the language
of monoidal categories and pass to other categories than FSet, then the situa-
tion changes. In fact, if this category has a †-functor, then to each commutative
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monoid corresponds a cocommutative comonoid. This already happens when
we relax the condition that µ and δ are functions to µ and δ being relations.
Let C be any symmetric monoidal category. A commutative C-monoid is
an object A ∈ |C| with morphisms:
µ : A⊗A→ A u : I→ A
which is commutative, associative and unital i.e.:
µ ◦ (µ⊗ 1A) = µ ◦ (1A ⊗ µ) µ = µ ◦ σ µ ◦ (1A ⊗ u) = 1A .
Similarly, a cocommutative C-comonoid is an object A with morphisms
δ : A→ A⊗A e : A→ I
which is cocommutative, coassociative and counital i.e.:
(δ ⊗ 1A) ◦ δ = (1A ⊗ δ) ◦ δ δ = σ ◦ δ (1A ⊗ e) ◦ δ = 1A
Now putting all of this diagrammatically, a commutative C-monoid is a pair:
: A⊗A→ A : I→A
satisfying:
= ==
and a cocommutative C-comonoid is a pair:
: A→ A⊗A : A→I
satisfying:
=
=
=
Recall here also that it is a general fact in algebra that if a binary operation
− • − both has a left unit 1l and right unit 1r, then these must be equal:
1l = 1l • 1r = 1r .
It then also follows that a commutative multiplication can only have one unit,
i.e. if it has a unit then it is completely determined by the multiplication. This
fact straightforwardly lifts to the more general kinds of monoids and comonoids
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that we discussed above, and therefore, we will at several occasions omit spec-
ification of the (co)unit.
Here is an example of commutative monoids and corresponding cocommu-
tative comonoids in FHilb on a two-dimensional Hilbert space:
::
{
|00〉, |01〉, |10〉 7→ |0〉
|11〉 7→ |1〉 ::
{
|0〉 7→ |00〉+ |01〉+ |10〉
|1〉 7→ |11〉
The first monoid has the ‘and’-operation applied to the {|0〉, |1〉}-basis as its
multiplication. The comultiplication is the corresponding adjoint.
Commutative dagger Frobenius algebras
Now consider the following three comultiplications:
µZ = Z ::
{
|00〉 7→ |0〉
|11〉 7→ |1〉 δZ = Z ::
{
|0〉 7→ |00〉
|1〉 7→ |11〉
µX = X ::
{
|+ +〉 7→ |+〉
| − −〉 7→ |−〉 δX = X ::
{
|+〉 7→ |+ +〉
|−〉 7→ | − −〉
µY = Y ::
{
| ] ] 〉 7→ | ] 〉
|= =〉 7→ |=〉 δY = Y ::
{
| ] 〉 7→ | ] ] 〉
|=〉 7→ |= =〉
Each of these is defined as a copying operation of some basis, respectively
Z = {|0〉, |1〉} X = {|+〉 = |0〉+ |1〉, |−〉 = |0〉 − |1〉}
Y = {|]〉 = |0〉+ i|1〉, |=〉 = |0〉 − i|1〉} ,
that is, the eigenstates for the usual Pauli operators. Each of these encodes a
basis in the sense that we can recover the basis from the comultiplication as
those vectors that satisfy:
δ(|ψ〉) = |ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 .
The fact that no other vector besides those that we by definition copy are in fact
copied is a consequence of the above mentioned no-cloning theorem [71, 187].
The corresponding multiplications are again their adjoints. These last ex-
amples embody the reason why we are interested in commutative comonoids.
What is already remarkable at this stage is that each of these encodes an or-
thonormal basis in a language only involving composition and tensor. There
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is no reference whatsoever to either sums or scalar multiples in contrast to the
usual definition of an orthonormal basis {|i〉} on a Hilbert space:
∀|ψ〉 ∈ H,∃(ci)i ∈ Cn : |ψ〉 =
∑
i
ci|i〉 ∀i, j : 〈i|j〉 = δij .
But there is more. In fact, one can endow these monoids and comonoids with
some additional properties, expressible in a language only involving composi-
tion, tensor and now also adjoint, such that they are in bijective correspondence
with orthonormal bases.
Definition. A commutative algebra in a symmetric monoidal category is a
pair consisting of a commutative monoid and a cocommutative comonoid on
the same object. A special commutative Frobenius algebra is a commutative
algebra which is moreover special and satisfies the Frobenius law, respectively:
=
=
.
A special commutative dagger Frobenius algebra or classical structure or basis
structure in a dagger symmetric monoidal category is a special commutative
Frobenius algebra for which the monoid is the dagger of the comonoid.
Think of an orthonormal basis B = {|bi〉}i for a Hilbert space H as the
pair (H,B) consisting of the Hilbert space which carries this basis as additional
structure. Since the multiplication and the comultiplication are related by the
dagger, and since having a unit is rather a property than a structure, we denote
a special commutative dagger Frobenius algebra on an object A as (A, δ).
Theorem. There is a bijective correspondence between orthogonal bases for
finite dimensional Hilbert spaces and special commutative Frobenius algebras
in FHilb. This correspondence is realized by the mutually inverse mappings:
• Each special commutative Frobenius algebra (H, δ) is mapped on (H,Bδ)
where Bδ consists of the set of vectors that are copied by δ.
• Each orthonormal basis (H,B) is mapped on (H, δB : H → H⊗H) where
δB is the linear map which copies the vectors of B.
Restricting to orthonormal bases corresponds to restricting to special commu-
tative dagger Frobenius algebras.
This result was shown by Pavlovic, Vicary and myself in [62].
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That classicality boils down to families of spiders is a consequence of the
fact that special commutative dagger Frobenius algebras are in bijective corre-
spondence with spiders, as our notation already indicated. This was shown by
Lack [136], but in a manner which is so abstract that it may not be accessible
to the reader. A more direct presentation of the proof is in [57].
Varying the coordinate system
But what if we change the category? It turns out that this mathematical
concept, when we look through coordinate systems other than FHilb, allows
us to discover important quantum mechanical concepts in places where one
doesn’t expect it, most notably ‘complementarity’ or ‘unbiasedness’ [169].
In [49] the author and Duncan defined complementarity in terms of special
commutative dagger Frobenius algebras, i.e. still in terms of a language only
involving composition, tensor and adjoint, in a manner which yields the usual
notion in FHilb. Concretely, it was shown that classical structures:(
H , δG =
)
and
(
H , δR =
)
in FHilb are complementary if and only if we have:
=
where is a normalizing scalar and is a so-called dualizer [60, 49], which
both are obtained by composing δ†g, δr, ug and u
†
r in a certain manner.
40
The quite astonishing fact discovered by Edwards and the author in [50]
was that even in FRel one encounters such complementary classical structures,
even already on the two-element set {0, 1}:
40Their explicit definition is not of importance here; it suffices to know that formally it
witnesses the role played by complex conjugation in adjoints, in the sense that it becomes
trivial (i.e. identity) when only real coefficients are involved, which is for example the case
for the Z- and X-classical structures for which we have:
=
Z Z
X X
Those acquainted with the field of quantum algebra [177] might recognize here the defining
equation of a Hopf-algebra, with the dualizer playing the role of the antipode. The apparent
non-symmetrical left-hand-side picture becomes symmetric if we represent the bases in terms
of the unitary operations which transform a chosen standard basis into them [65].
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Z ::
{
(0, 0) 7→ 0
(1, 1) 7→ 1 Z ::
{
0 7→ (0, 0)
1 7→ (1, 1)
::
{
(0, 0), (1, 1) 7→ 0
(0, 1), (1, 0) 7→ 1 ::
{
0 7→ (0, 0), (1, 1)
1 7→ (0, 1), (1, 0)
Meanwhile, Pavlovic, Duncan and Edwards, and Evans et al., have classified all
classical structures and complementarity situations in FRel [155, 79, 85].
Example: Spekkens’ toy qubit theory. It is a particular case of these
complementarity situations in FRel which gives rise to Spekkens’ toy qubit
theory discussed above and hence its striking resemblance to quantum the-
ory. This exploration of FRel is still an unfinished story. While, for example
Spekkens’ toy theory is a local theory, we strongly suspect that we can discover
non-locality (in the sense of [51]) somewhere within FRel.41
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